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Heterogeneous Effects of Child Development 
Accounts on Savings for Children’s Education 
 
Abstract 
In this study, we use data from SEED for Oklahoma Kids (N = 2,677), a statewide policy experiment testing 
Child Development Accounts (CDAs), to examine effects on individual savings for children’s postsecondary education. 
Built on the account structure of the Oklahoma 529 College Savings Plan, the experiment automatically opened state-
owned 529 accounts for children in the treatment group with a $1,000 initial deposit, and encouraged their caregivers 
to open and save in participant-owned 529 accounts. Using quantile regressions and statistical match, the study focuses 
on the effects of CDAs on the shape of the savings distribution among participants who hold a participant-owned 
account for their children. Results suggest that the intervention has heterogeneous effects, affecting individual saving 
performance of about 8% of treatment participants. Treatment participants we expect would hold their own 
participant-owned accounts without the intervention have about $400 more in savings than their counterparts in the 
control group. Treatment participants who are motivated by the intervention to hold a participant-owned account have 
mean deposits of nearly $900. All those who are motivated by the intervention to save have mean deposits of $1,826. 
A high proportion of treatment group participants motivated by the CDA intervention to have participant-owned 
accounts have socioeconomically disadvantaged characteristics; the CDA intervention reduces inequality in savings for 
children’s education. While the CDA intervention affects some treatment participants’ individual savings, total assets 
accumulated in both state-owned and participant-owned accounts can play an important role in financing postsecondary 
education. When appropriately designed, CDAs can promote asset building among all children, and holding assets is a 
promising policy tool to improve college preparedness and help finance postsecondary education. 
Keywords: 529 plans, asset building, Child Development Accounts, college savings, postsecondary education 
 
Introduction 
This study examines the effect of Child Development Accounts (CDAs) on parents’ savings for 
children’s postsecondary education. We use data from SEED for Oklahoma Kids (SEED OK), a 
statewide policy experiment that offered CDAs to treatment participants. Built on the existing 
account structure of the Oklahoma 529 College Savings Plan (OK 529 plan), the SEED OK 
intervention automatically opened state-owned 529 accounts with a $1,000 initial deposit for 
children in the treatment group and also encouraged their parents (or other caregivers) to open and 
save in participant-owned 529 accounts. 
CDAs provide structured opportunities (e.g., financial access, information, and incentives) to 
encourage lifelong asset building and to promote child development (Goldberg, 2005; Sherraden, 
1991). CDAs are promising policy tools for promoting asset building in early life and preparing 
families for children’s postsecondary education (Nam, Kim, Clancy, Zager, & Sherraden, 2013). 
Given increasing policy concern about rising college costs and student loan debt, it is important to 
understand the effects of CDAs on college savings. For example, the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau reports that the total amount of student loan debt was approaching $1.2 trillion in 2013, and 
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more than seven million borrowers were in default (Chopra, 2013). Studies also show that 
postsecondary education is one of the top saving priorities for families with children, and over 60% 
saved for that purpose in 2009 (Sallie Mae, 2009). With institutional support and financial incentives 
from CDA programs, families may accumulate more assets for children than they would by saving in 
basic savings accounts. Previous research demonstrates that, in addition to providing financial 
benefits, the asset-holding process created by CDAs may improve parenting expectations and 
practices, as well as child development outcomes (Huang, Sherraden, Kim, & Clancy, 2014; Huang, 
Sherraden, & Purnell, 2014; Kim, Sherraden, Huang, & Clancy, 2013), and are associated with 
children’s long-term educational achievement (Elliott & Beverly, 2011). 
Limited empirical evidence shows the effects of CDA holding on participant savings. One study 
(Nam et al., 2013) using SEED OK data up to 2009 finds that CDAs significantly increased the rate 
of participant-owned account holding from 1% in the control group to 16% in the treatment group. 
Across the full treatment group, mean individual savings was $47 in participant-owned accounts. 
While modest, this was significantly higher than that in the control group. Among treatment 
participants holding participant-owned accounts, mean savings was about $300 (Nam et al., 2013). 
These results suggest that the CDA intervention has varying effects for those with participant-
owned accounts and those without, and may change the shape of the savings distribution especially 
at the top percentiles. Therefore, this study uses SEED OK data through 2013 to examine the 
effects of CDAs on the (a) shape of the savings distribution and (b) amount of individual savings 
among those with participant-owned accounts. 
The SEED OK Experiment 
The SEED OK experiment is a statewide randomized experiment asking (among other questions) 
whether CDAs encourage parents to begin accumulating assets for their child’s postsecondary 
education from birth. The experiment drew a probability sample of 7,328 children from all infants 
born in Oklahoma during two 3-month periods (April–June and August–October in 2007). Among 
caregivers of these infants—most of whom are mothers, the term we will use hereafter—2,704 
agreed to participate in the experiment and completed a baseline survey between fall 2007 and spring 
2008, resulting in a response rate of 37%. The low participation rate may have been caused by 
mothers’ reluctance to provide the child’s Social Security number, a requirement for opening an OK 
529 account (Nam et al., 2013). After the survey, SEED OK researchers randomly assigned 1,358 
mothers to the treatment group and 1,346 to the control group (Marks, Rhodes, & Scheffler, 2008). 
The state of Oklahoma provides tax credits for 529 plan contributions up to $10,000 per year per 
person or $20,000 for married couples filing jointly. Investment earnings in 529 accounts used for 
eligible educational costs are not subject to federal or state taxes. While the OK 529 plan and 
associated tax benefits are available to anyone, SEED OK included information about the OK 529 
plan and additional financial incentives for treatment mothers (Figure 1). 
The first incentive was a $1,000 initial deposit into a state-owned account held for the beneficiary 
child. The state treasurer’s office automatically opened state-owned accounts for all but one (whose 
mother opted out) member of the treatment group. Second, treatment mothers also were 
encouraged to open and make deposits into their participant-owned accounts. The OK 529 plan 
requires a $100 minimum initial contribution to open such an account. To remove any financial 
barriers to account opening, the SEED OK intervention included a contribution of the required   
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Figure 1. SEED OK financial incentives by treatment status. Adapted from Huang, Nam, and Sherraden (2013, p. 6). 
Copyright 2012 by the American Council on Consumer Interests. Note: OK 529 accounts = Oklahoma 529 College 
Savings accounts; SEED OK = SEED for Oklahoma Kids. 
 
$100 initial deposit to treatment mothers who opened participant-owned accounts by April 15, 2009. 
The third incentive was a savings match. From 2008–2011, SEED OK included matches to deposits 
into participant-owned accounts made by low- and moderate-income treatment mothers. 
Households with an annual adjusted gross income (AGI) below $29,000 were offered a 1:1 match—
in which every dollar deposited was matched with one dollar—up to $250 per calendar year. 
Households with an AGI between $29,001 and $43,499 were eligible for a 0.5:1 match—in which 
every dollar deposited was matched with 50 cents—up to $125. The $29,000 cutoff corresponded 
with the median AGI for Oklahoma in 2006, and the $43,500 cutoff corresponded to 150% of the 
median. 
The office of Oklahoma’s State Treasurer mailed various forms of correspondence (e.g., letters, 
postcards, and brochures) to treatment mothers on behalf of the SEED OK study. Communication 
materials were designed primarily to explain the features of the state-owned account, encourage 
treatment group mothers to open participant-owned accounts, and prompt them to begin saving for 
their child’s postsecondary education. The OK 529 plan mailed OK 529 account statements each 
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calendar quarter to treatment mothers. These statements showed any deposits and reported the 
market value of the account. The SEED OK study occasionally mailed small gifts (e.g., books or 
music CDs) to treatment children. Information was provided almost exclusively by mail due to the 
experimental nature of the study, and study participants may not have received or read the materials 
(Beverly, Clancy, & Sherraden, 2014; Gray, Clancy, Sherraden, Wagner, Miller-Cribbs, 2012). 
Mothers in the control group have received no information from SEED OK researchers about the 
OK 529 plan. The treasurer’s office did not automatically open a state-owned account for their 
children, and they received no financial incentives. However, like all others outside the experiment, 
they are free to open their own participant-owned accounts in the state’s OK 529 plan. 
Effects of the SEED OK Experiment 
While CDAs have been implemented or demonstrated a number of countries, the SEED OK 
experiment has the most rigorous research design to evaluate CDA effects. Research on SEED OK 
suggests that the CDA intervention has positive effects on parenting and child development 
(Beverly et al., 2014). Kim et al. (2013) assess changes in SEED OK mothers’ expectations for their 
children’s future postsecondary education and find that the proportion of mothers whose 
expectations declined over 3 years is smaller in the treatment group than in the control group. 
Another study (Huang, Sherraden, & Purnell, 2014) suggests that the CDA intervention in SEED 
OK has significant effects on reducing maternal depressive symptoms, and the effects are larger for 
subsamples with disadvantaged characteristics. Huang et al. (2014) find that, at age 4, treatment 
group children from low-income or low-education families show significantly higher levels of social-
emotional development than their counterparts in the control group. 
Overall, research on the SEED OK experiment has provided evidence of positive effects on diverse 
measures of asset holding. In addition to a higher rate of account holding and a greater amount of 
savings in participant-owned accounts among treatment mothers, 99.9% of the treatment group 
mothers (all but one, who opted out for religious reasons) hold a state-owned account automatically 
opened for their child (Nam et al., 2013). The total assets accumulated—including savings, SEED 
OK financial incentives, and investment returns—are substantively and significantly higher for the 
treatment group. 
Several studies examine the heterogeneous effects of the SEED OK CDA intervention on asset 
accumulation by demographic and socioeconomic characteristics. For example, Huang, Nam, and 
Sherraden (2013) find that mothers’ financial knowledge is positively associated with participant-
owned account holding and observe a significant interaction effect between financial knowledge and 
treatment group status. Relative to the control group mothers with low levels of financial knowledge, 
treatment-group mothers with any level of financial knowledge have significantly higher account 
holding rates. 
Beverly, Kim, Sherraden, Nam, Clancy (2012) examine the effects of SEED OK on savings 
outcomes by various demographic groups (e.g., income, race and ethnicity, parents’ education level, 
banked status, homeownership, public assistance, and primary language spoken). The study finds 
that treatment group children from advantaged families are more likely to hold participant-owned 
accounts and have higher savings amounts than similar control group children. However, variations 
by demographic characteristics are lower in the treatment group than in the control group. In other 
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words, the universal and progressive SEED OK intervention has greater positive effects among 
disadvantaged families. 
Wikoff, Huang, Kim, and Sherraden (2013) ask whether SEED OK has a greater effect on 
participant-owned account holding among families experiencing material hardship than on their 
counterparts who are not. Results demonstrate a negative association between material hardship 
experience and account holding in general, but this association is different by treatment status. 
Compared to control group mothers, treatment group mothers are more likely to hold participant-
owned 529 accounts at all levels of material hardship. This finding demonstrates that CDAs can 
lessen adverse effects of material hardship and encourage families experiencing it to make a financial 
plan for their children’s future postsecondary education. 
These studies show that both treatment and control families with socioeconomically disadvantaged 
characteristics (e.g., low incomes, material hardship, or low levels of financial knowledge) are less 
likely to hold and save in participant-owned accounts. Reasons for not holding accounts include lack 
of surplus income, lack of information, misunderstanding the accounts and incentives, and the 
length of time until their children are college age (Gray et al., 2012). Another possible reason is the 
regressive nature of tax benefits in the OK 529 College Savings Plan. Given the regressive nature of 
the Oklahoma 529 College Savings Plan (and all College Savings Plans as they were originally 
designed), the disparity in asset holding and asset accumulation by socioeconomic status exists even 
within the treatment group. 
However, the studies also show that universal and progressive incentives in the CDA intervention 
reduce the asset-holding gap between advantaged and disadvantaged families within the treatment 
group. In other words, SEED OK reduces—though does not completely remove—the 
socioeconomic disparity in asset accumulation. This point is of great importance because findings 
can be easily misunderstood. For example, it is empirically incorrect to conclude that CDAs increase 
inequality based on the still-existing disparity within the treatment group. The greater effects on 
asset accumulation among disadvantaged groups also are consistent with greater nonfinancial 
positive outcomes, which exhibit the same pattern (e.g., Huang et al., 2014; Huang, Sherraden, & 
Purnell, 2014). 
While the studies discussed above assess whether asset-accumulation effects of SEED OK vary by 
demographic and socioeconomic characteristics, the present study examines heterogeneous effects 
of CDAs very specifically. We focus on how these effects are reflected in the shape of savings 
distribution, and the amount of savings deposited by the mothers. 
Methods 
Data and Sample 
This study uses survey and account data from SEED OK, including a baseline telephone survey 
conducted on all study mothers between 2007 and 2008 and quarterly account data up to 2013 
obtained from the manager of the OK 529 plan. Baseline survey data contain detailed demographic 
and socioeconomic information about SEED OK mothers, and quarterly account data provide 
accurate information (i.e., account-holding status, account balance, deposits, and withdrawals) for all 
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OK 529 accounts—including state-owned and participant-owned—opened for children in the 
SEED OK experiment. 
Of the 2,704 study participants, 2,677 are included in the final analysis sample. First, SEED OK 
participants who did not live in Oklahoma at the time of the baseline survey (n = 22) are excluded 
because nonresidents may be less likely to hold a participant-owned account given different tax 
benefits of the 529 plans in Oklahoma and their resident states. The final sample also excludes 
participants who are not mothers (i.e., fathers, grandparents, and siblings; n = 5). 
Measures 
The dependent variable is individual savings amount deposited by mothers into participant-owned 
accounts, which we created using account data from January 1, 2008, to December 31, 2013. This 
measure indicates mothers’ net financial investment for children’s future education and does not 
include investment earnings or SEED OK incentives (i.e., the $100 account-opening incentive, 
$1,000 seed deposit, and savings matches). Since the study is mainly interested in money saved in 
participant-owned accounts, we refer to mothers who hold these accounts as participant-owned 
account holders. Mothers who do not hold accounts and those who hold accounts but do not make 
any contributions have a value of 0 for the dependent variable. The independent variable is an 
indicator of SEED OK treatment status. Mothers in the treatment group are coded as 1, and those 
in the control group are coded as 0. 
Other variables include children’s, mothers’, and households’ characteristics. First, children’s 
characteristics include age measured in months and gender (1 = male and 0 = female). Mothers’ 
characteristics include race (White, Black, American Indian, and other), age (<20, 20–29, and ≥30), 
education (below high school, high school, some postsecondary education, and 4-year postsecondary 
education or above), marital status (1 = married and 0 = not married), and employment status (1 = 
employed, 0 = unemployed). 
Control measures of household characteristics include household size, number of children, 
homeownership status (1 = homeowners and 0 = otherwise), welfare program participation (1 = yes 
and 0 = no), household income-to-needs ratio, receipt of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC; 1 = 
yes and 0 = no), and location. The variable of household size is top-coded at 7 because only a small 
proportion of households have more members. Number of children in the household is categorized 
into four groups (one child, two children, three or more children, or missing). Almost 40 mothers do 
not report this information in the baseline survey. Households have a value of 1 on the measure of 
welfare program participation if they received income from Temporary Assistance for Needy 
Families (TANF), Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), Supplemental Security 
Income (SSI), or Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) in the previous 12 months. They have a 
value of 0 if they did not receive any benefits from these programs. Household income-to-needs 
ratio is the between a household’s pretax income and the 2007 federal poverty thresholds adjusted 
for household size (Annual Update of the HHS Poverty Guidelines, 2007). Households are 
categorized into four groups by their income-to-needs ratio (below 2, between 2 and 4, above 4, and 
missing). Household location is indicated by the first three digits of the zip code. 
The study also controls for several indicators of asset ownership and financial management. Assets 
include checking accounts (1 = yes and 0 = no), savings bonds (1 = yes and 0 = no), credit cards (1 
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= yes and 0 = no), and home equity loans (1 = yes and 0 = no). Financial management is indicated 
by whether mothers set financial goals (1 = often true, 2 = sometimes true, and 3 = rarely true) and 
whether friends and relatives expect mothers to help out when they have extra money (1 = often 
true, 2 = sometimes true, and 3 = rarely true). 
Statistical analysis 
Quantile regression and the shape of savings distribution 
First, we report descriptive statistics by treatment status to examine whether randomization has 
successfully created two comparable groups. We then run quantile regressions to evaluate the CDA 
intervention’s effect on the shape of the savings distribution. Quantile regression models the 
relationship between independent variables and specific percentiles of the savings distribution (Hao 
& Naiman, 2007; Koenker & Hallock, 2001). We chose quantile regression because only a small 
proportion of treatment mothers and an even smaller proportion of mothers in the control group 
opened and made deposits into participant-owned accounts, and the savings distribution is highly 
skewed. The skewed distribution implies that the relationship between the SEED OK experiment 
and participant-owned savings varies at different percentile points on the savings distribution. The 
model specification can be summarized as follows: 
Qθ(Yi)= βθ,0 + βθ,1·Ti + ε
θ
i, 
where Qθ(Yi) indicates the θth percentile of the savings in participant-owned accounts; Ti denotes 
whether a study mother i belongs to the treatment group or not; and εi is random error. In this 
equation, the coefficient of βθ,0 is the estimated θth percentile of the savings for the control group, 
and the coefficient of treatment status (βθ,1) estimates a difference in the θth percentile of the savings 
between treatment and control groups. The quantile regression is weighted to adjust the 
oversampling of minority groups and the discrepancies between mothers and nonmothers (Marks et 
al., 2008). To improve model convergence, we did not include control variables in the quantile 
regression. Since the CDA intervention was assigned randomly, we assume that (a) the inclusion of 
control variables does not change the results and (b) the treatment and control groups have 
comparable demographic and socioeconomic characteristics. For the purpose of improving model 
convergence, Marks, Engelhardt, Rhodes, and Wallace (2014) use propensity score weighting to 
include a proxy of demographic characteristics in quantile regression and do not find that control 
variables change the estimated effects of the CDA intervention. 
Statistical match and mean savings 
Quantile regression identifies (a) the percentage of mothers whose saving performance has been 
affected by SEED OK and (b) the treatment–control difference in the percentiles of the savings 
distribution. We use statistical match to evaluate the effect of the SEED OK intervention on the 
amount of savings among participant-owned account holders. A statistical match is useful because 
the mean difference in savings amounts between treatment group participant-owned account 
holders and their control group counterparts is not a valid measure of the CDA’s effect. Holding a 
participant-owned account and making deposits into it are self-selected actions, rather than the 
randomly assigned results of the SEED OK intervention. Therefore, the treatment–control mean 
difference in savings amounts among participant-owned account holders is confounded with other 
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determinants (e.g., income, education, and saving motivation) that affect holding of and saving into 
the account. Some of these determinants may not be observed in the study. Because they opened 
and held participant-owned accounts without additional SEED OK incentives, control group 
participant-owned account holders are more motivated to save for children. They also are more 
likely to have resources to save than most treatment group participant-owned account holders, who 
have been encouraged by SEED OK incentives to open and hold the account. 
Therefore, to assess the effect of SEED OK on savings amounts among participant-owned account 
holders, we contrasted savings amounts of control group members with those of treatment group 
members who we expect might have held an account even without the presence of SEED OK. We 
then consider the savings amounts of the rest of treatment group participant-owned account holders 
to be the net effect of the CDA intervention on those motivated by the intervention because their 
counterparts in the control group do not hold or save in participant-owned accounts. In other words, 
the treatment group can be categorized into three subgroups: (1) those without participant-owned 
accounts who are not motivated by the current design of the intervention to hold and save in an 
account; (2) those who we would expect to hold accounts even without SEED OK; and (3) those 
who would not hold accounts without the intervention. 
Statistical match can separate subgroups 2 and 3. We identify a set of variables on which all 
participant-owned account holders in the control group share the same responses and find treatment 
group mothers who have the same responses for statistical match. For example, if all control group 
participant-owned account holders have a 4-year postsecondary education degree or above, we 
assume that treatment group mothers who are likely to hold an account without the intervention 
should be selected from those with the same level of education. If the statistical match successfully 
separates two subgroups of treatment group account holders, we hypothesize that the number of 
control group participant-owned account holders (n = 12) should be very similar to the number of 
their matched treatment group account holders. After statistical match, we can compare average 
savings amounts in participant-owned accounts to evaluate SEED OK effects. We did not use 
propensity score match because only 12 control group mothers hold participant-owned accounts, 
and many demographic variables can perfectly predict account-holding status in a binary model 
because the sample size is small. 
Results 
Sample characteristics 
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics of all variables by treatment status. Less than 15% of SEED 
OK mothers are younger than 20 years old. The majority of SEED OK mothers are White (about 
78%); about 40% have at least some college education; and nearly 60% are married. At the time of 
the baseline survey, less than half (about 45%) were employed. The mean household size is four, and 
two thirds of households have fewer than two children. Less than half of mothers own their homes, 
and more than 40% of households received at least one public assistance benefit in the 12 months 
prior to the baseline survey assessment. Nearly 70% of households have an income-to-needs ratio of 
less than 2. Treatment and control groups do not have statistical differences in these observed 
demographic characteristics, which indicates successful randomization before implementation of 
SEED OK. 
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Table 1. Demographic and Socioeconomic Characteristics of the Sample (N = 2,677) 
 Weighted percentage or mean 
Variables 
Treatment group 
(n = 1,343) 
Control group 
(n = 1,334) 
Child’s characteristics   
Age (mean) 78.35 78.33 
Gender (male) 53.44 52.75 
Mother’s characteristics   
Age   
<20 13.81 13.99 
20–29 61.80 61.45 
≥30 24.39 24.56 
Race    
White 78.05 77.44 
African American 9.06 9.25 
American Indian 11.61 11.86 
Asian  1.28 1.45 
Education   
Below high school 22.34 22.35 
High school  37.89 37.93 
Some postsecondary education 18.19 18.73 
4-year postsecondary education or above 21.58 20.99 
Marital status (married) 59.19 60.65 
Employment status (employed) 44.69 46.53 
Household characteristics   
Household size (mean) 4.20 4.13 
Number of children   
1 33.73 37.10 
2 33.45 33.01 
3 or more 31.14 28.95 
Missing 1.67 0.94 
Homeownership (yes) 42.05 41.66 
Welfare participation (yes) 40.48 41.55 
Income-to-needs ratio   
<200% 65.84 66.50 
200–400% 17.86 17.94 
>400% 12.45 12.97 
Missing 3.85 2.59 
EITC income 27.55 25.73 
Asset ownership and financial management   
Checking account (yes) 74.39 73.34 
Savings bond (yes) 8.46 9.34 
Credit card (yes) 39.82 42.89 
Home equity loan (yes) 5.85 4.72 
Set financial goals   
Often true 47.54 49.98 
Sometimes true 38.33 36.09 
Rarely true 14.13 13.93 
Help friends and relatives   
Often true 12.36 12.44 
Sometimes true 24.93 25.93 
Rarely true 62.71 61.64 
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Table 2 reports participant-owned account-holding status and savings amounts in participant-owned 
accounts. In total, 201 (17%) mothers in the treatment group and 12 (1%) mothers in the control 
group hold participant-owned accounts. Eight percent of treatment group mothers have deposited 
savings into their participant-owned accounts. The mean duration of account holding is 21 quarters. 
The nonweighted average savings amount is $158 for all mothers in the treatment group (including 
zero for those without participant-owned accounts) and $26 in the control group. The treatment–
control difference in participant-owned savings is statistically significant at the .001 level. Because 
about 92% of treatment group mothers and more than 99% of control group mothers do not have 
savings in participant-owned accounts, the median savings amount for both groups is $0. Among 
those holding participant-owned accounts, the nonweighted mean savings amount is $1,053 for the 
treatment group and $2,863 for the control group. A direct comparison of these two means shows 
that the mean savings amount among control group account holders is statistically higher than that 
among treatment group account holders (p < .01). As we discussed above, this is not a valid measure 
of the CDA intervention’s effect on savings amounts among participant-owned account holders. 
Thirty-seven treatment group savers have received savings matches from SEED OK, and the mean 
savings amount among this group is $927. 
Results of quantile regressions 
Table 3 reports results of quantile regressions estimating different percentiles of savings amounts in 
participant-owned accounts. For comparison, we list results of the linear regression in the first 
column. On average, control-group mothers saved $32 in participant-owned accounts while 
treatment-group mothers saved $153 (p < .001) by the end of 2013. Consistent with descriptive 
results reported in Table 1, results of quantile regressions suggest that the savings distribution is 
highly skewed and the CDA intervention affects only a proportion of treatment group mothers’ 
saving performance. As indicated by the coefficients for the constant, the savings amount among 
control group mothers is $0 at the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles. The coefficients for treatment 
mothers suggest that treatment group mothers do not have different savings amounts at these three 
quartiles. However, starting from the 95th percentile, the coefficient for the treatment status variable 
is positively and statistically significant. At the 95th percentile, treatment group mothers save $390 
more than control group mothers (p < .05). The treatment–control difference increases to $1,600 at 
the 97th percentile (p < .001) and $3,640 at the 99th percentile (p < .001). Thus, SEED OK changes 
the shape of the savings distribution and affects saving performance mainly among treatment group 
mothers in the top percentiles (8%). Another way to look at this is that SEED OK markedly affects 
savings amounts but only among a modest portion of treatment mothers. 
Figure 2 is a graphic representation of results in Table 3. The dashed line is the coefficient for the 
treatment status in the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression and shows the effect of the CDA 
intervention averaged to all treatment group mothers across all percentiles. The solid line represents 
coefficients for the treatment status variable in quantile regressions and shows that the effect of the 
CDA intervention is heterogeneous, affecting less than 10% of treatment group mothers. Figure 2 
also demonstrates that treatment group participant-owned savings amounts are equal to or higher 
than savings amounts in control group accounts at all percentile points. 
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Table 2. Participant-Owned Account Holding Status and Savings (N = 2,677) 
 Weighted percentage or mean  Nonweighted percentage or mean 
Variables Treatment group 
(n = 1,343) 
Control group 
(n = 1,334) 
 Treatment group 
(n = 1,343) 
Control group 
(n = 1,334) 
Holding a participant-owned account**      
Frequency 201 12  201 12 
Percentage 16.84 1.02  14.97 0.90 
Mean quarters of account holding 21.03 21.00  21.38 19.25 
Amount of savings in participant-owned accounts      
Mean** 152.93 32.18  157.67 25.75 
Median 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 
% of mothers with >$0 savings 8.51  0.86  7.52 0.82 
Maximum  28,800.00 9,750.00  28,800.00 9,750.00 
Mean among mothers with participant-owned accounts* 908.11 3,163.34  1,053.46 2,862.50 
Mean among mothers who received a savings match (n = 37) 927.54   926.70  
*p < .01; **p < .001. 
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Table 3. Results of Quantile Regressions: Amount of Savings by Treatment Status (N = 2,677) 
 Mean 25% 50% 75% 95% 96% 97% 98% 99% 
Constant 32.18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Treatment group 120.75*** 0 0 0 390* 702.58** 1,600*** 1,750*** 3,640** 
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. 
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Figure 2. Coefficients of quantile regressions. 
 
Statistical match and mean savings among participant-owned account holders 
The first column of Table 4 shows that control group mothers with participant-owned accounts (n = 
12) share many characteristics. For example, only White and American Indian control group 
mothers hold participant-owned accounts, and participant-owned account holders in the control 
group are all older than 20 years of age and have 4-year college degrees. Their households have 
incomes above 200% of the poverty threshold and were not receiving EITC income at the baseline. 
Account holders in the control group also have basic financial access (e.g., checking accounts and 
credit cards) and often set financial goals for their families. 
Among 2,677 study participants, we identified 86 mothers—40 from the treatment group and 46 
from the control group (including the 12 participants-owned account holders)—who share the 
characteristics listed in the first column of Table 4. Fourteen of the 40 mothers from the treatment 
group hold participant-owned accounts for their children. Matched with account holders in the 
control group, these 14 treatment group mothers are considered those who would hold accounts 
without the CDA intervention. As shown in the first column of Table 5, the mean savings amount is 
$2,863 for the 12 control group account holders and $3,258 for the 14 matched treatment group 
account holders. While treatment group account holders have a greater mean savings amounts, there 
is no statistical difference between the two means (p = .84). This comparison also shows that 
additional SEED OK incentives do not crowd out the amount of savings in participant-owned 
accounts for this subgroup within the treatment group.
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Table 4. Demographic and Socioeconomic Characteristics by the Statistical Match Status 
 Frequency (%) 
Variables 
Control group  
account holders 
(n = 12) 
Treatment group  
account holders not matched 
(n = 187) 
Treatment group  
mothers without accounts 
(n = 1,142) 
Mother’s demographic characteristics    
Race/ethnicity     
Caucasian 9 (75) 133 (71) 698 (61) 
American Indian  3 (25) 25 (13) 230 (20) 
Age (older than 20) 12 (100) 179 (96) 950 (83) 
Education (4-year postsecondary education and above) 12 (100) 95 (50) 173 (14) 
Household characteristics     
Household size (3 or 4) 12 (100) 122 (65) 671 (59) 
Number of children (1 or 2) 12 (100) 131 (70) 746 (64) 
Income-to-needs ratio (above 200%) 12 (100) 109 (58) 303 (27) 
Households with EITC income (No) 12 (100) 127 (77) 770 (71) 
Asset ownership and financial management    
Checking account (Yes) 12 (100) 170 (91) 747 (66) 
Savings bonds (No) 12 (100) 158 (86) 1,049 (94) 
Credit card (Yes) 12 (100) 128 (69) 371 (33) 
Home equity loans (No) 12 (100) 162 (89) 1,066 (96) 
Set financial goals (often true) 12 (100) 102 (55) 513 (45) 
Friends/relatives expect me to help out (rarely true) 12 (100) 129 (69) 666 (58) 
Note: The table does not report demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of matched treatment group account holders because they are the same as those 
reported in the first column for control group account holders. Treatment group account holders not matched with control group account holders are affected 
substantially by the SEED OK CDA intervention, and treatment group mothers without accounts are those not affected. 
HETEROGENEOUS EFFECTS OF CHILD DEVELOPMENT ACCOUNTS ON SAVINGS FOR CHILDREN’S EDUCATION 
 
 
 
C E N T E R  F O R  S O C I A L  D E V E L O P M E N T  
W A S H I N G T O N  U N I V E R S I T Y  I N  S T .  L O U I S  
17 
Table 5. Mean Savings in Participant-Owned Accounts by Statistical Match Status 
 
n 
Mean 
savings 
Mean  
differencea P valueb 
Main statistical match     
Control group account holders 12 2,863 
395 .84 Matched treatment group account holders 14 3,258 
Treatment group account holders not matched 187 888   
Supplemental analysis 1     
Control group account holders 12 2,863 
335 .87 Matched treatment group account holders 33 3,198 
Treatment group account holders not matched 168 632   
Supplemental analysis 2     
Control group account holders 12 2,863 
126 .95 Matched treatment group account holders 16 2,989 
Treatment group account holders not matched 185 886   
a This column reports the difference in mean savings in participant-owned accounts between control group account 
holders and matched treatment group account holders. 
b This column reports the p value of t tests comparing the savings in participant-owned accounts between control group 
account holders and matched treatment group account holders. 
 
After removing the 14 treatment group account holders, the remaining treatment group account 
holders (n = 187) compose the subgroup encouraged by the CDA intervention to open and hold an 
account. The mean savings for this subgroup is $888, which we consider the net effect of SEED OK 
because their counterparts in the control group do not hold or save in participant-owned accounts. 
We find that 91 of these 187 account holders made contributions to participant-owned accounts, 
and the mean savings amount is $1,826. 
While the variables in Table 4 seem to be reasonable predictors of mothers’ participant-owned 
account holding, the process of statistical matching cannot be perfect. Therefore, we ran 
supplemental tests by reducing the number of variables used for matching, which reduces 
restrictions on matching (and provides a less perfect fit and more conservative results). First, 
removing several variables—including EITC income, economic support of friends and relatives, 
ownership of savings bonds, and home equity borrowing—generates 33 account holders in the 
treatment group matched with those in the control group. In the second supplemental test, we 
removed the zip code variable, which generated 16 treatment group account holders. Results for 
these two supplemental tests are reported in the second and third columns of Table 5 and are 
consistent with those discussed above. 
Who is affected by SEED OK to save? 
Statistical match helps identify those encouraged to save by the CDA intervention. The second and 
third columns of Table 4 report characteristics of matched variables for treatment group mothers 
motivated by the intervention to hold accounts (n = 187) and those who are not (n = 1,142). Overall, 
the groups in the second and third columns are more socioeconomically disadvantaged than control 
group account holders and less likely to have a college education, have household income above 200% 
of the poverty line, own savings accounts and credit cards, or set financial goals. These findings are 
consistent with previous research predicting parents’ saving performance for children’s education 
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(Huang, Beverly, Clancy, Lassar, & Sherraden, 2013; Nam et al., 2013). It is important to note that, 
while control group account holders all have a college education degree and incomes above 200% of 
the poverty threshold, the percentages of treatment group mothers affected by the intervention on 
these two variables (the second column of Table 4) are much lower: 50% and 58%, respectively. In 
other words, a high proportion of treatment group mothers motivated by the universal and 
progressive features of the CDA intervention to have participant-owned accounts have 
socioeconomically disadvantaged characteristics. The CDA intervention reduces inequality in savings 
for children’s education. 
Discussion 
Results summary 
Previous SEED OK research estimates the treatment–control difference in mean assets and savings 
using the intention-to-treat approach (Nam et al., 2013). The experiment achieves universal 
participation through automatic opening of state-owned accounts for children in the treatment 
group. The average asset amount—which includes savings, SEED OK incentives, and investment 
returns—is greater than $1,000. To provide a supplemental understanding of CDA effects on 
personal savings for children’s education, this study examines how the intervention affects the shape 
of the savings distribution and amount of savings among participant-owned account holders. 
Results suggest that SEED OK affects saving performance for a proportion of treatment group 
mothers. When we focus on only the treatment group mothers affected by the intervention, the 
estimated effect on savings is greater than previous estimates based on the intention-to-treat 
approach. The treatment–control difference increases from $390 at the 95th percentile to $3,640 at 
the 99th percentile, while the treatment–control difference in mean savings is $121. For treatment 
group mothers who would have held a participant-owned account without the intervention (n = 14), 
the offer of additional financial incentives does not crowd out their contributions. If we take into 
consideration duration of account holding, the annual mean savings is about $180 for treatment 
group mothers motivated by the SEED OK experiment to hold participant-owned accounts (n = 
187) and about $350 for those motivated by the experiment to save in the accounts (n = 91). More 
than one third of treatment savers are eligible for savings matches, and their nonweighted average 
savings ($927) is only slightly less than that of all treatment mothers with a participant-owned 
account ($1,053). 
Effect size for account holders 
How should we interpret the size of these effects? The CDA intervention has changed 8% of 
treatment group mothers’—including a significant portion of those in socioeconomically 
disadvantaged families—financial planning and saving performance for children’s postsecondary 
education. The effect on participant-owned savings among these 8% of treatment mothers is not 
negligible. Control group mothers opened participant-owned accounts at a rate of less than 1%. 
Moreover, the mean savings amount among treatment group mothers motivated by the intervention 
to save (n = 91; $1,826) is about 65% of that among control group mothers with participant-owned 
accounts ($2,823). Without the SEED OK intervention, the amount of these mothers’ savings for 
their children in participant-owned accounts would have been $0 instead of $1,826. 
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We can put this amount of savings in a broader context of challenges in saving. For example, in 
2010, the average net worth of the poorest 40% of U.S. households declined to ˗$10,600 (Wolff, 
2012). Nearly half of Americans cannot come up with $2,000 for an unexpected need within a 
month (Lusardi, Schneider, & Tufano, 2011). The percentage of parents with children younger than 
age 18 who saved for postsecondary education declined from 60% in 2010 to 50% in 2013 (Sallie 
Mae, 2013). Overall, to save and accumulate assets was much harder for many American families 
during the economic downturn. Yet even in this environment, SEED OK treatment participants 
substantially increased their savings in the CDA. 
Is the increased savings amount enough to matter? The average 2013–2014 in-state tuition for 4-year 
colleges in Oklahoma is $6,583 (College Board, 2013), not including costs for room and board. 
Assuming a 5% annual increase, the college planning calculator developed by Sallie Mae (College 
cost calculator, n.d.) estimates that in-state tuition for a 4-year postsecondary education in 
Oklahoma will be $48,528 in 2025. If treatment group mothers who are motivated by the 
intervention to hold participant-owned accounts (n = 187) maintain the same saving pattern until 
their children are 18 years old, and the savings have a 5% rate of return, the average amount balance 
will be about $4,400, approximately 9% of the total tuition cost. If treatment group mothers 
motivated by the SEED OK CDA intervention to save (n = 91) maintain the same saving pattern, 
the average amount balance will be nearly $7,500, or 15% of the total tuition cost. If we include the 
SEED OK initial $1,000 deposit and account-opening $100 deposit, the predicted percentages of 
total tuition cost are 13% and 23%, respectively. 
Since most savings are invested in age-based funds, the return rate may be even higher than 5%, 
according to historical fund performance data (Historical investment performance, n.d.). Also, 
college tuition rates are higher than actual average college costs. As shown in reports from Sallie 
Mae (2013), parents on average paid for 9% of children’s postsecondary tuition from savings in 2012, 
and parents of children younger than age 18 expect to use savings to finance a similar percentage of 
children’s postsecondary education. Projected savings amounts ($4,400 and $7,500) also are 
comparable to estimated financial aid (i.e., $5,040) for a typical child in the sample at age 18 (Marks 
et al., 2014). Overall, these data indicate that savings and asset accumulation created by the CDA 
intervention among participant-owned account holders are substantively meaningful in helping 
finance children’s postsecondary education and are consistent with parents’ saving expectations. 
Accumulated savings in CDAs may play an even more important role in financing postsecondary 
education if these mothers increase the amount of savings over time, and in general, parents are 
more likely to save for education when children get older and closer to college age. A report from 
Sallie Mae (2013) suggests that the amount of parental savings for children ages 13–17 is about three 
times the amount of that for children ages 0–6. 
How to expand effects of CDAs 
It is important to note that the majority of treatment group mothers (92%) have not as yet made 
contributions in participant-owned accounts. Parents’ financial decisions about whether to save for 
their children’s education are affected not only by the CDA intervention but also by demographic 
and socioeconomic characteristics and other institutional conditions. The studies mentioned above 
(i.e., Lusardi, Schneider, and Tufano [2011] and Wolff [2012]) demonstrate the great challenge of 
saving and accumulating assets. Families with young children tend to make financial investments 
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based on a hierarchy of needs (Xiao & Noring, 1994) and may make financial planning for children’s 
futures less of a priority than more immediate needs. 
Results of this study and previous SEED OK research suggest that asset-building programs matter. 
The CDA intervention affects saving performance in some households, and the amounts of 
participant-owned savings and assets are meaningful to children’s postsecondary education. A 
critical question is the extent to which CDA programs counteract asset-accumulation constraints and 
enable more people to accumulate savings and assets for their children. For example, how do we 
reduce the area between the dashed line and the solid line in Figure 2 and increase the level of the 
dashed line? The design of specific program features may provide the answer. For example, state-
owned SEED OK accounts are automatically opened for treatment group mothers by the state 
treasurer’s office, and almost all (99.9%) treatment group mothers still hold the accounts several 
years later, a substantial experimental impact (Nam et al., 2013). 
Regarding practical policy application, the SEED OK experiment demonstrates that automatic 
account opening is a highly successful strategy for inclusion of a full population. Moreover, this 
research has influenced state officials in Nevada to launch Nevada College Kick Start—which 
automatically opened and seeded with $50 college savings accounts for about 3,400 kindergarten 
students in 13 rural communities—as a pilot program in 2013. Statewide expansion of the program 
announced in 2014 includes nearly 35,000 public school kindergarten students. In March 2014, 
influenced directly by SEED OK results, the State of Maine announced that all newborns will 
receive an automatically opened CDA seeded with $500 (Beverly at al., 2014). 
Additional research on automatic account opening and other asset-building features provides 
important insight into how to design more inclusive asset-building programs (e.g., Choi, Laibson, 
Madrian, & Metrick, 2004). An emerging institutional theory of saving identifies constructs—access, 
information, incentives, expectations, facilitation—that shape saving actions and performance and 
can be used to guide future CDA development (Beverly et al., 2008; Sherraden, Schreiner, & Beverly, 
2003). In this institutional view, saving may have little to do with individual behaviors—e.g., 
automatic enrollment and saving in a 401(k)—yet may still have positive long-term results. 
Overall, the SEED OK effect on savings amounts is limited at this stage to a small proportion of 
treatment group mothers, but this does not mean that the intervention has no effect on asset 
holding and child development for the rest of the treatment group. Personal saving is only one way 
to accumulate assets. Almost all treatment group mothers received $1,000 in state-owned accounts 
for children’s future education. This asset holding has generated positive effects on parental 
educational expectations and child development and may continue to have positive effects in the 
long term. As shown in previous research, the effects of SEED OK on maternal depressive 
symptoms and children’s social-emotional development are not related to saving performance in 
participant-owned accounts (Huang et al., 2014; Huang, Sherraden, & Purnell, 2014). In other words, 
the holding of an account with assets is what matters, regardless of the source. 
Limitations 
This study has some limitations. First, SEED OK does not provide detailed data on households’ 
savings for children’s postsecondary education other than that in OK 529 accounts. Accordingly, 
this study cannot examine the relationship between CDA and other children’s savings. Control 
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group members may be more likely than their treatment counterparts to save in other accounts. If so, 
this study may overestimate the treatment effects of the SEED OK CDA intervention. Second, the 
study uses account data collected for the first 6 years of the intervention, reporting short-term—but 
not long-term—effects of expanded financial access. Considering that parents can save for their 
children’s education over 18 years, 6 years may be too short a period to evaluate the full effect of the 
SEED OK CDA intervention. Future research on long-term effects is warranted. Third, the sample 
includes only children born in Oklahoma and does not represent children in other states or the 
United States as a whole. In addition, SEED OK researchers drew a probability sample of 7,328 
infants. Only 37% participated in the experiment, which may raise the issue of external validity. 
Although study participants looked much the same as nonparticipants on most observed variables, it 
is possible that important differences remain unobserved. 
Policy and research implications 
This research has several policy and research implications. First, results show that savings in 
participant-owned accounts can play an important role in financing children’s postsecondary 
education for treatment group mothers affected by the intervention. Since an extremely small group 
of mothers in the control group save in participant-owned accounts, the intervention increases the 
number of savers by about nine times. Thus, CDAs can be a promising policy tool for helping 
families become financially prepared for children’s postsecondary education and begin accumulating 
assets for children in early childhood. Second, future CDA programs should identify and test 
features that promote accumulation of more assets for children’s education. With appropriate 
program design, CDAs have the potential to expand program effects to a greater population, 
especially among mothers with socioeconomic disadvantages. 
By removing treatment group mothers who would have held participant-owned accounts without 
the SEED OK CDA intervention, the study identifies a group of mothers whose saving 
performance for children are directly affected by it. This could inform future evaluations of the 
effects of the CDA intervention on other aspects of individual well-being, which could contribute to 
theoretical specification going forward.   
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